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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SA I .T I i AKE COMMUNIS

" EGE,

Petitioner,

:
:

•

:

'

Case No, 930374-CA

v .

:
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH and PAUL T, KIRBY,

Priori I. y 7

:

Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
• •
1 : ...

Jurisdiction c\e:
•.

this appeal

.-,

- --uini

i s conferred *
§

7 M i'a :i I ,'

' ,

providing i :.i appellate jurisdiction over "orders and decrees
resulLxi :
agencies

-« * •

Appeals dated August

adjudicat vr- proceedings
.-.*.:

. .

issued

. : state
- • e Utah Court of

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

ISSUES
1.

Whether the January 22, 1993, Determination and

Order issued by the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division is invalid
because it was not signed by the Director, as required by Utah
Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(5) (Supp. 1993) and Utah Admin. Code R5601-4 (A) (1) (1993) .
2.

Whether the Industrial Commission erroneously

concluded that the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") could not
extend the 30-day filing period for "good cause" pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(9) (Supp. 1993) because the ALJ's
"jurisdiction" to consider such an extension ended on the
thirtieth day.
3.

Whether the ALJ improperly issued his decision,

that Salt Lake Community College's ("the College's") request for
an evidentiary hearing was untimely, before the time for the
College to respond to Paul Kirby's pending Motion to Strike had
expired.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issues 1 is brought pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 6 3 46b-16(4)(e) (1989), and should be reviewed by this Court for
correctness, giving no deference to the agency's conclusion of
the appropriate procedure.

Krantz v. Utah Dept. of Commerce, 856

P.2d 369 (Utah App. 1993).

2

Issues 2 and 3 are brought pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
63-46b-16(4)(d) (1989), and should likewise be reviewed under a
correction-of-error standard, with no deference to the agency's
interpretation of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act
("UAPA").

Morton Int'l Inc. v. Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 581 (Utah

1991).

DETERMINATIVE OR IMPORTANT PROVISIONS
Provisions determinative of, or of central importance
to, the issues on this appeal are set forth in their entirety in
Addendum A to this Brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent, Paul Kirby, filed a complaint with the Utah
Anti-Discrimination Division ("UADD") on August 26, 1992,
alleging that the College had discriminated against him.
5).

(R. 1-

After an informal investigation, an investigator and an

attorney with UADD signed a Determination and Order, dated
January 22, 1993, ordering the College to hire Kirby in a fulltime faculty position, and give him back pay plus ten percent and
attorney fees.

(R. 540, 549) (Addendum B & C ) .

In a Response dated February 18, 1993, and filed
February 23, 1993, the College requested a de novo review of the
UADD Determination and Order in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §
34-35-7.1(5) (c) (Supp. 1993).

(R. 551-57).

On March 8, 1993,

Kirby filed a Motion to Strike the College's request for a formal
3

evidentiary hearing as untimely.

(R. 559)•

On March 11, 1993,

before the College had filed any response to Kirby's Motion to
Strike, the ALJ issued an ORDER OF DISMISSAL (Addendum D ) ,
denying the College's request for an evidentiary hearing as
untimely.

(R. 579).
The College then sought agency review with the

Industrial Commission.

On May 14, 1993, the Industrial

Commission affirmed the ALJ's ruling that the College's request
for a formal evidentiary hearing to adjudicate Kirby's
discrimination claims was untimely.

(R. 614). Subsequently, the

Commission also denied the College's Motion for Reconsideration
on June 8, 1993.

(R. 639-41).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In March of 1992, the College advertised a position for
a full-time Spanish professor.

(R. 555-56).

Paul Kirby, a white

male, and approximately twenty-five others applied for the
position.

(R. 60). Kirby was among thirteen candidates invited

by the initial screening committee to interview for the position.
(R. 59-60) . After the initial round of interviews, Kirby was
ranked eleventh.

(R. 60). The top six finalists were referred

to the dean for further consideration, and the successful
applicant for the position was Laura Gaona-Bradford, an Hispanic
female.

(R. 60). Kirby filed a complaint with UADD on August

26, 1992, alleging that the College had discriminated against him
when it failed to hire him for the position.

4

(R. 1-5).

An investigator for UADD informally investigated
Kirby's complaint and found that Kirby was a member of two
protected classes, "white" and "male", and that the College had
discriminated against him on both bases.
B).

(R. 544-45) (Addendum

Randall Phillips, an investigator, and Colleen Trayner, an

attorney with UADD, signed the Determination, dated January 22,
1993.

(R. 548) (Addendum B).

The stated basis for the UADD

Determination was the assumption that the successful candidate,
Ms. Gaona-Bradford, had to have a Master's degree in July 1992.x
(R. 545). Attorney Trayner, signed the Order, also dated January
22, 1993, requiring the College to hire Kirby in a full-time
faculty position as a Spanish professor, and give him back pay
(approximately $2,000 per month since August 1992) plus ten
percent and attorney fees.

(R. 549-50) (Addendum C).

Neither

document was signed by the director of UADD, Anna R. Jensen.
On February 23, 1993, the College filed a Response to
the Determination and Order that included a request for a de novo
formal evidentiary hearing with the Industrial Commission.
551).

(R.

On March 8, 1993, Kirby filed a Motion to Strike the

College's request for a formal evidentiary hearing as untimely.
(R. 559). Three days later, on March 11, 1993, before the
College had filed any response to Kirby's Motion to Strike, the

1. This assumption was erroneous because the materials
submitted to the UADD during the informal investigation showed
that the applicant only needed to complete a master's degree by
the time the employment began, which was fall quarter, 1992. Ms.
Bradford successfully completed this requirement. (R. 76, 555-56)
(Addendum G)

5

ALJ issued his ORDER OF DISMISSAL, denying the College's request
for an evidentiary hearing as untimely.

(R. 579) (Addendum D ) .

The Industrial Commission affirmed the ALJ's ORDER OF DISMISSAL
on May 14, 1993.

(R. 614) (Addendum E).

The Commission

concluded that the general UAPA provision allowing for an
extension of time periods for good cause, Utah Code Ann. § 6346b-l(9) (Supp. 1993), did not apply to UADD proceedings and
thus, no extension of the time for requesting a formal
evidentiary hearing was available to the College for "good
cause."

(R. 615). The College then filed a Motion for

Reconsideration with the Industrial Commission, which was denied
on June 8, 1993.

(R. 639) (Addendum F).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The UADD Determination and Order, dated January 22,
1993, that is the basis for the rulings from the ALJ and the
Industrial Commission is not a valid order because it was not
issued by the Director of UADD as required by Utah Code Ann. §
34-35-7.1(5) (Supp. 1993) and Utah Admin. Code R560-1-4(A)(1)
(1993) . The Director cannot delegate to subordinates the quasijudicial power that the statute explicitly requires the director
to perform.

The UADD, therefore, issued an invalid order and the

Commission lacked jurisdiction to review the order. Accordingly,
the College requests this Court to vacate the final order of the
Commission and remand the case, directing the Commission to
return the case to UADD for entry of a Determination and Order
6

that complies with Utah law and Commission rules.
Second, even if the UADD Determination and Order were
valid, the Industrial Commission erroneously held that the ALJ
could not extend the thirty-day filing period for "good cause"
under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(9) (Supp. 1993).

This Court has

held that this general provision of UAPA applies to intra-agency
time periods. Moreover, the ALJ does not lose his power or
"jurisdiction" to act in a case when the thirty-day filing period
for review has elapsed.

The ALJ is able to grant a good cause

extension after the initial filing period has elapsed.
Finally, the ALJ should not have ruled that the
College's request for an evidentiary hearing was untimely before
the time for the College to respond to Kirby's pending Motion to
Strike had elapsed.

The ALJ should have given the College an

opportunity to respond to Kirby's assertion of untimeliness and
to present its good cause reason for an extension of the filing
period.

7

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE FAILURE OF THE UADD DIRECTOR TO ISSUE A VALID FINAL
ORDER DEPRIVES THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE MATTER.
A.

Under the UADD Statute and Commission Rules, Only the
UADD Director Can Issue Determinations and Orders.
Utah's Anti-Discrimination Act ("the UADD statute")

governs the procedure for filing claims, investigations, and
adjudicative proceedings. Utah Code Ann. §§ 34-35-7.1(1) through
(16) (Supp. 1993).

Section 34-35-7.1(5)(a) provides that when an

agency investigator uncovers sufficient evidence during his
investigation to support allegations of discrimination, the
investigator shall report those findings to the director.

Upon

receipt of that report "the director may issue a determination
and order based on the investigator's report." Utah Code Ann. §
34-35-7.1(5) (b) (Supp. 1993) (Only an order issued in accordance
with this section can trigger the 3 0-day period for requesting an
evidentiary hearing on the discrimination claim).
the statute, the Director is to issue the order.

According to
There is no

language that discusses or recognizes any authority to delegate
this duty to subordinates.
The January 22, 1993, Determination from the Industrial
Commission was signed by two employees of UADD, Randall Phillips,
Investigator, and Colleen Trayner, Esquire.

(R. 548). The

accompanying Order was signed only by Ms. Trayner.

(R. 550).

Neither document was signed by the Director of UADD, Anna R.
Jensen, as required by the Anti-Discrimination Act.

8

The Commission argues that "a careful reading of the
relevant statutes and rules will show that the Division Director
may delegate the authority to issue Orders "that it considers
necessary for the enforcement of this chapter to a subordinate."
(R. 739). In fact, section 34-35-5(1) (a) states only that the
"Utah Antidiscrimination Division may:

(a) appoint and prescribe

the duties of investigators and other employees and agents that
it considers necessary for the enforcement of this chapter."
There is no language or inference that permits the Director to
delegate her section 34-35-7.1(5) decision-making powers to a
subordinate.
The Commission also argues that provisions of UAPA,
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-5(1)(i) and -2(h) (1989), allow the
delegation of the decisional function by the Director.

Although

the term "presiding officer" in these provisions can include an
agency head's designee if one is authorized, UAPA does not
authorize every agency head to have a designee.

Also, no

evidence has been presented to establish that the UADD has a
designee, or a policy, if its director is unavailable.
Consistent with the UADD statute that gives the
Director the duty and the power to make initial determinations
and orders, the Commission's own rules specifically delineate the
distinct roles of the Director and her staff in the informal
investigation process.

Those rules state that the Director, not

a designee, shall issue the initial determination and order.
Utah Admin. Code R560-1-4(A)(1) (1993) (Addendum A).
9

The rule

further provides that the Director may request legal staff to
review an investigatory file and make recommendations to the
Director prior to the Director's issuance of the initial
Determination and Order.
A valid rule or regulation duly promulgated by a public
administrative agency is binding on the agency, and on individual
officials to whom its terms apply.
363, 388 (1957).

Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S.

There can be no question that an administrative

agency is bound by its own regulations.

See School Bd. of

Broward County, Fla. v. H.E.W., 525 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1976).
Moreover, there is a strong public interest in requiring
government agencies to observe their own regulations.

American

Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 1858 v. Callaway, 3 98 F. Supp.
176, 196 (D. Ala, 1975) .
Courts have consistently held that an administrative
decision or order must be made by an officer authorized to do so.
The decision of the administrative officer must ultimately be
that of the officer himself, who bears full legal and personal
accountability for that which bears his name.

Braniff Airways,

Inc. v. C.A.B., 379 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1967).

Likewise, the

United States Supreme Court has held that although evidence may
be taken by an examiner, and may be "sifted and analyzed" by
subordinates,

"the officer who makes the determinations must

himself consider and appraise the evidence which justifies them.
That duty may be an onerous one, but the performance of it in a
substantial manner is inseparable from the exercise of the
10

important authority conferred."

Morgan v. United States, 298

U.S. 468, 481-482 (1936).
Similarly, the UADD statute confers upon the UADD
Director the authority of issuing determinations and orders.
Although the director may rely on investigators to compile
evidence, the Director, herself, must nevertheless make the final
determination.

An improper UADD ruling, as in this case, could

prove extremely costly to a defendant.

If this order, signed by

an employee lacking the proper authority, is upheld, the College
will have to create a full-time faculty position for which it
does not have the resources or fire a qualified faculty member.
The evidence before the UADD informal investigator
correctly showed that the successful candidate need only receive
the required Master's degree by Fall quarter, when the teaching
position would begin. (R. 555-56) (Addendum G).

However, the

employees that issued the determination and order based their
decisions on the erroneous assumption that the Master's degree
was required at the time of the applicants' interviews, directly
contrary to the evidence.

This crucial oversight demonstrates

the pertinence of the Supreme Court's conclusion in Morgan to
this case and the statutory mandate requiring the UADD Director
to issue all determinations and orders. The Director, acting
with her ultimate authority, must "consider and appraise" the
evidence herself before determining to issue a binding
determination and order.

In this case, not only did Anna Jensen

fail to participate in the issuance of the determination and
11

order against the College, there is no evidence that Anna Jensen
ever reviewed any of the evidence.

The allowance of such

improper agency action would effectively destroy the critically
important checks and balances provided in the UADD statute.
The issue of jurisdiction and the importance of an
authorized signature on an order has been previously addressed in
the context of appellate court review of an inferior court order.
In Salt Lake City Corp. v. Griffin, 750 P.2d 194 (Utah App.
1987), this Court held that when the record reveals no judgment
or sentencing order signed by the trial court, the appellate
court is without jurisdiction to consider the merits of the
appeal due to the absence of a final judgment.

Similarly, the

record in this case reveals no order signed by the authorized
official from UADD, therefore the ALJ and Industrial Commission
are without jurisdiction to consider an appeal.

Thus, there is

to date, no valid UADD order that would commence the 30-day
period in section 34-35-7.1(5) (c) .
Under Utah administrative law, decisions of an
administrative agency must be made by those in which the law
vests the power of the decision.

The plain language of the UADD

statute and controlling case law mandate that only the Director
has the authority to make initial determinations and issue orders
in discrimination cases. However, in this case, there is no
evidence that the authorized official, Director Anna Jensen, ever
saw the investigator's report, reviewed any evidence, or
participated in the final determination against the College.

12

Because the UADD Director did not issue the order, as required by
statute and agency rules, the purported UADD order against the
College is not valid.

And, as a result, the Industrial

Commission lacked jurisdiction to review the matter.
B.

The Director Cannot Delegate to Subordinates the
Quasi-Judicial Function that Section 34-35-7.1(5)
Requires Her to Perform.

Section 34-35-7.1(5) grants the UADD Director quasijudicia] authority to determine the merits of discrimination
complaints and to issue orders binding on the parties.
Administrative officers cannot delegate to subordinates powers or
functions that are quasi-judicial in character or which require
the exercise of judgment, and subordinate officials have no power
with respect to such duties.

State Tax Comm'n v. Katsis, 90 Utah

406, 62 P.2d 120, 122 (1936).

The fact that the legislature gave

the Commission authority to employ investigators, attorneys and
other employees that may be necessary to perform investigatory
and administrative duties does not give the Commission or the
Director any authority to delegate quasi-judicial functions to
such employees.

Id.

Respondents claim that in instances of potential bias
the Director may need to delegate her quasi-judicial power to
subordinates.

However, Respondents are confusing the delegation

powers available to a "presiding officer" and the duties assigned
to the "director" under the UADD statute.

The UADD statute

clearly distinguishes between a presiding officer and a director.
A "presiding officer" under this statute means an agency head or
13

an individual designated by the agency head to conduct an
adjudicative proceeding.2

However, the "director" is defined as

the individual who manages the enforcement of the UADD statute.
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-2(4) (Supp. 1993).

The provisions

concerning the issuance of determinations and orders refer only
to the director. Section 34-35-7.1 (5) (b) states that "the
director may issue a determination and order based on the
investigator's report" and section 34-35-7.1(5) (c) refers to "the
director's determination and order."

Thus, the statute clearly

specifies that only the Director can issue a determination and
order, and does not permit the Director to delegate her quasijudicial function to subordinates.

Moreover, section 34-35-

7.1(5) (c) provides for a de novo review by the Industrial
Commission if a party is dissatisfied with the Director's
determination and order for any reason--including the Director's
bias.
Although the UADD statute and rules allow for
investigation and recommendations by subordinates, they also
explicitly mandate that the determination and order be issued by
the authorized UADD official, and that official is the Director.
C.

The Affidavit of Anna Jensen was Improperly
Introduced for the First Time On Appeal and Should
be Stricken From the Record.

The initial Determination in this case was signed by

2. The UADD Statute, Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-2(15) (Supp.
1993), states that a "presiding officer" means the same as the
term's definition in UAPA, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-2(l)(h)
(1989) .
14

two UADD employees, Randall Phillips, an investigator and Colleen
Trayner, an attorney.

(R. 548). The accompanying Order was

signed only by the attorney.

(R. 550). On appeal, the

Commission now asserts that Anna Jensen, the UADD Director,
delegated her decision-making authority because of her sua sponte
concerns about the appearance of partiality toward the College.
(R. 737-38).

The Commission relies upon the Affidavit of Anna

Jensen and its conclusory statements as a basis for its position
that the duty to issue an order can be and was in fact
delegated.3
Even if this Court determines that the Director's
quasi-judicial function can be delegated to subordinates in cases
of potential bias, there is no evidence in the agency record to
support the Commission's belated assertions that the Director was
potentially biased, that this bias was the basis for her
delegation, and that delegation in fact occurred.
The Commission first introduced these "facts" on appeal
when it submitted an Affidavit of Anna Jensen with its Memorandum
in Opposition to the College's Motion for Summary Disposition.

3. The Commission also asserts: "Anna Jensen's Affidavit
shows that the delegation authority Petitioner complains of did
not prejudice the Petitioner, but, rather, resulted in an Order
which was legal, fair and unbiased as required by the Act." (R.
738) . The determination of whether a legal, fair, and unbiased
order was issued is for a court to decide, not Anna Jensen. The
order issued by the Director's subordinates is invalid,
regardless of whether it was prejudicial. However, if prejudice
were the standard, the College would contend that it is per se
prejudicial for the individuals who informally investigated the
discrimination charges to also make the final determination and
issue the binding order.
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The Commission cannot present new factual evidence for the first
time on appeal.

Longstanding principles of appellate law dictate

that the reviewing court cannot rule on a "question which depends
for its existence upon alleged facts unsupported by the record."
State v. Smith, 700 P.2d 1106, 1109 (Utah 1985); Uckerman v.
Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978).
Therefore, the College moves this Court to strike the
Affidavit of Anna R. Jensen submitted with the Commission's
Memorandum in Opposition and disregard all references it.
D.

Conclusion

The UADD has not yet issued a valid order.

The UADD

clearly violated its own rules and statutory law requiring the
Director to issue all determinations and orders.

In addition,

the Director cannot delegate her quasi-judicial power.

In this

case, to hold that the UADD lawfully issued the determination and
order would vest power in division employees to make binding
orders, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(5) and UADD
rules.

The purpose of this statutory scheme is to ensure a fair

investigatory process and assure that binding orders are issued
by the person with the proper authority, rather than by an
individual who informally investigated the discrimination charge.
Therefore, the College asks this Court to vacate the
Commission's ruling on the basis of agency error, and remand this
case with directions to the Commission to remand to the UADD for
entry of a Determination and Order that complies with section 3435-7.1(5).
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POINT II
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT THE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE COULD NOT EXTEND THE 30-DAY
FILING PERIOD FOR "GOOD CAUSE" UNDER UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 63-46b-l(9).
Section 34-35-7.1 (5) (c) provides, that "[a] party may
file a written request to the director for an evidentiary hearing
to review de novo the director's detrmination and order within 30
days of the date of the determination and order."

The College

sought a one-day extension of this thirty-day time period for
requesting review of a Determination and Order in section 34-357.1(5) (c) on the basis of good cause.

(R. 583). However, the

Commission concluded that the UAPA good cause extension provision
in section 63-46b-l(9) did not apply, and that the ALJ lacked
power to do anything in the case after the thirty-day period
elapsed.

(R. 614-16).
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d) (1989),

the Commission's erroneous interpretation of the law has
substantially prejudiced the College by precluding an
adjudication of Kirby's discrimination claims in an evidentiary
hearing.
Under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"),
nothing restricts "a presiding officer, for good cause shown,
from lengthening or shortening any time period prescribed in this
chapter, except those time periods established for judicial
review."

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(9) (Supp. 1993).

This

general provision of UAPA applies unless a superseding statute
explicitly states that it is to apply instead of UAPA.
17

Utah Code

Ann. § 63-46b-l(l) (Supp. 1993).

In Maverik Country Stores. Inc.

v. Industrial Commission, 860 P.2d 944, 950 (Utah App. 1993),
this Court recognized that a good cause extension under UAPA's
section 63-46b-l(9) can be applied to intra-agency time periods
for review.

In Maverik, the employer was seeking an extension to

the filing period for an agency rehearing but failed to show good
cause.

The court stated that "the authority to grant an

extension in a filing deadline is not an agency-specific statute,
but rather a general provision of UAPA."

Id.

In fact, the

Industrial Commission conceded in Maverik that its intra-agency
time limits could be extended under the good cause extension
provision in section 63-46b-l(9).

Id. at 948, 950.

In this case, the College requested a good cause
extension of an intra-agency time period in section 34-357.1(5) (c) for requesting a de novo review of the UADD's
determination and order.

The Commission's inconsistent assertion

that the good cause extension under UAPA does not apply to this
time period is incorrect.

In light of this Court's

interpretation of the UAPA provisions set forth in Maverik. the
College can receive an extension of the intraagency filing period
for requesting review in section 34-35-7.1(5) (c) under the UAPA
provision for good cause.
The Commission's ruling that the ALJ had no
"jurisdiction" to consider an extension after the initial thirtyday filing period is erroneous.

The Commission concluded that

lf

[t]he [College] failed to timely request an extension of time in
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which to file or timely file its motion for review.

Therefore

the commission lacks jurisdiction to take any action other than
to dismiss this matter."

(R. 616). There is no agency rule or

applicable statutory provision stating the time period in which a
party must request a good cause extension.

However, the Utah

Supreme Court recently upheld the Tax Commission's consideration
of a request for a section 63-46b-l(9) good cause extension (of
the period for filing for agency reconsideration) long after the
filing period for both a reconsideration petition and a petition
for judicial review had expired.4

Harper Investments, Inc. v.

Auditing Div.. No. 920310, slip op. at 3 (Utah Feb. 2# 1994).
The court thus implicitly rejected the Commission's view here
that an agency is deprived of "jurisdiction" to consider
extending a filing period once that period has expired.
This determination is consistent with the approach used
in the judicial context.

Under Rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of

Appellate Procedure, which applies to appeals from the district
court to the court of appeals, a request for an extension of time
to file a notice of appeal can be filed after the original
thirty-day period has run, if it is within the next thirty-day
period.

Likewise, under Rule 48(e) the Supreme Court can extend

the time for filing a petition or cross-petition for a writ of
4. The Tax Commission issued its final order on January 9,
1992. Harper Investments, slip op. at 2. The period for filing a
reconsideration petition ended on January 29, see Utah Code Ann. §
63-46b-13(1) (a) , and the complaining parties filed their section
63-46b-l(9) good cause extension request sometime after February
20, 1992, which was forty-two days after the original agency order.
Harper Investments, slip op. at 2.
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certiorari if a motion is filed within thirty days after the
original deadline.

Utah R. App. P. 48(e).

Such extensions can

be granted for excusable neglect or good cause.

See State v.

Price, 837 P.2d 578, 582-83 (Utah App. 1992) (discussing time
extensions available under Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure).
This practice allows the district judge or the Utah Supreme Court
to act in a case after the original filing period for invoking
the next level of appellate review has passed; thus, expiration
of the original filing period does not strip the judge or court
of all power or "jurisdiction" to act on the extension request.
Similarly, the ALJ can grant a request for a good cause
extension that was filed after the expiration of the original
filing period.

The time elapsed should be merely one factor that

will be considered in the "good cause" determination.

This Court

should hold that section 63-46b-l(9) good cause requests can be
filed after the time period for requesting intra-agency review in
section 34-35-7.1 (5) (c) has expired.
Because of the ALJ's precipitous ruling, the College
never had the opportunity to make its good cause showing to the
ALJ.

In Maverik, the court stated that "for an agency to extend

any deadline established under UAPA the petitioner must show good
cause."

860 P.2d at 950.

In this case, the Commission ruled

that the College's request to the ALJ for an evidentiary hearing
was untimely before the College could respond to Kirby's Motion
to Strike.

The Commission, therefore, never gave the College a

proper opportunity to establish good cause for an extension.
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The Commission incorrectly relied on Varian-Eimac v.
Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569 (Utah App. 1989), in determining that the
ALJ lacked the power to act in any capacity after the thirty-day
period had elapsed.

In Lamoreaux, the parties were disputing the

timeliness of a motion filed after the statutory filing period
rather than the ALJ's ability to consider a request for a good
cause extension of an untimely motion.

767 P.2d at 570. As a

result, UAPA's good cause extension provision was not argued by
either side and was never mentioned by the court.5

This

decision would not require the ALJ, in the instant case, to lose
the power to allow the College to file a section 63-46b-l(9) good
cause extension.
Instead, in Lamoreaux, the court was considering whether the
Industrial Commission, having received a motion for review which
was two days late, could decide the substantive merits of the
case without first making findings as to the timeliness of the
motion.

Id. at 570. The court of appeals determined that the

Commission, just like a court, must first determine whether it
has jurisdiction and, therefore, remanded the case to the
Commission, requiring it to make factual findings as to the
timeliness of the motion.

Id. at 571.

In this case,

Lamoreaux

would require the ALJ to make factual findings to determine
whether good cause existed for an extension in light of section

5. The Commission, in its Order on Motion for Reconsideration
and Clarification, dated June 8, 1993, stated that Lamoreaux was a
"pre-Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) decision!]." (R.
640) .
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63-46b-l(9) . As mentioned above, the ALJ did not allow the
College to establish a good cause for extension of the filing
period, as allowed under section 63-46b-l(9), and thus failed to
make a complete finding on the matter.

Therefore, due to the

Commission's misconception as to the ALJ's jurisdictional limits,
the College has been substantially prejudiced.
In conclusion, the ALJ had the power to extend the
filing period for requesting review under UAPA's good cause
extension.

The ALJ does not lose all power to act in a case

after the thirty day period has expired.

Therefore, the College

requests this Court to reverse the order of the Industrial
Commission that affirms the ALJ's order of dismissal, and to
remand the case to the Commission with instructions to send the
case back to the ALJ to permit the College to request, for good
cause, a one-day extension of the time period for seeking de novo
review of the UADD's determination.

POINT III
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE IMPROPERLY DENIED THE
COLLEGE'S REQUEST FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING BEFORE THE
TIME FOR THE COLLEGE TO RESPOND TO KIRBY'S PENDING
MOTION TO STRIKE HAD EXPIRED.
After the College filed its request for an evidentiary
hearing with the ALJ, Kirby filed a Motion to Strike stating that
the College's request was untimely.

(R. 559). The ALJ then

ruled that the College's request was untimely before the time for
the College to respond to Kirby's motion had expired.

(R. 579).

The ruling was improper because it precluded the College from
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providing its good cause showing for an extension of the filing
period under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(9).
The ALJ should have allowed the College to respond to
Kirby's pending Motion to Strike before ruling that the College's
request for an evidentiary hearing was untimely.

Although a

pleading is not required of the party opposing a motion, "the
opposing party must still provide, if it can, evidence or
authority to overcome the case made by the moving party."
v. District Court, 251 P.2d 840, 846 (Mont. 1953).

McVay

Generally, "a

party interested in resisting the relief sought by a motion has a
right to notice and an opportunity to be heard."

Id.; see also

Edaar v. Garret, 456 P.2d 944, 946 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969) ("It is
fundamental to justice and fair play that a party be afforded an
opportunity to be heard on matters which affect his interest.");
State v. Johnson, 594 P.2d 333, 334-35 (Mont. 1979) (finding that
allowing party to oppose motion ensures fundamental fairness and
fully informed court).
Courts have held that "it is the right of the respondent, if
he would take issue on the merits, to submit on the motion
affidavits and papers in opposition to the motion."
2d Motions,

Rules

and Orders

56 Am. Jur.

§ 20 (1971) (citing Bredfield v.

Hannon, 91 P. 334, 334 (Cal. 1907); Randall v. Randall, 166 P.
516, 517-18 (Kan. 1917)).

The Judge "may not grant the motion

without making a determination of the fact issues raised by the
responding party."

Id. § 20; cf. Gillmor v. Cummincrs, 806 P.2d

1205, 1208 (reversing premature grant of summary judgment because
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plaintiff was entitled to file response to defendant's motion to
strike portions of affidavits opposing summary judgment).

In

this case, the College was not allowed to respond to Kirby's
Motion to Strike and therefore could not raise the facts
supporting a good cause extension of the filing period.

Because

Kirby's motion was based on the issue of timeliness, the College
should have been allowed to rebut Kirby's motion by making a good
cause showing for an extension before the ALJ made his ruling on
the issue.
The College, therefore, asks this Court to reverse the
ALJ's Order of Dismissal and the Industrial Commission's order
affirming the ALJ's order, and to remand this case to the
Industrial Commission with instructions to allow the College to
establish good cause for an extension.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the
Industrial Commission should be vacated and remanded to the UADD
for issuance of an order that complies with Utah's AntiDiscrimination Act and the Commission's own. rules.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

r r / d a y of February, 1994

L. A. DEVER (0875)
Deputy Solicitor General
CONSTANCE L. HUGHES (54 87)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

DETERMINATIVE OR IMPORTANT PROVISIONS

"°?"x

rf the U t a h Code Annotated provides

"Coordinator" i "director 11 means the individual who manages
t ne e:;f o: cemen: c f t h i s* chapter.

"Presiding officer" m< •<*:*£•" i ne same as * :;at term is d e n n e d
in Section 63-4 6b 2

. .
- - ~- ~. *- .»:„aLiw*. ~.

_ A n n o t a t e d provides
<

~m m ^ v :

^ _
ana prescribe the dur.es or
investigators and other employees and agents that
it considers necessary for the enforcement of this
chapter;

3S-n

n f

S^

'Svr^

199J

,, •. cah Code A n n o t a t e d provides

,a,

ii L:,e ;n;:ial attempts a
* ., - - ..; -- * ••
u n s u c c e s s : J ] and the investigator uncovers
sufficient evidence during his investigation -o
support the allegations of a discriminatory or
p r o h i b i t e d employment practice set out in tr:e
request for agency action, the investigator sr.^,
formally report these findings tr the directoi

(I: •)

U p oi i i eceipt of t h = :i
. ^ i.<=^... . L ^ e
fill; ::i rector m a y issue 5 >
^ . o n and order based
oi I the investigator "
'
" s i epor t.

(c)

A p a r t y m a y file a w r i t t e n request to the director
for a n evidentiary hearing to review de n o v o the
d i r e c t o r ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n and order w i t h i n 30 *****
of the date of the determination and order.
If the director receives n o timely request for a
hearing, the d e t e r m i n a t i o n and order issued by the
d i r e c t o r requiring the respondent to cease any
d i s c r i m i n a t o r y or prohibited employment practice
and to p r o v i d e relief to the aggrieved p a r t y
b e c o m e s t- e final order of th- r.;--?nmission,

R. 560-1-4(A)(1) (1993) of the Utah Administrative Code provides:
The initial Determination and Order of the Division,
after the completion of an investigation on a charge of
discrimination, shall be issued by the Director. The
Director may request that the Commission's legal staff
review an investigatory file and make a recommendation
to the Director prior to the issuance of the initial
Determination and Order. The Director may refer a
request for agency action back to an investigator for
further investigation when necessary.

§ 63-46b-l(l) (Supp. 1993) of the Utah Code Annotated provides:
Except as set forth in Subsection (2), and except as
otherwise provided by a statute superseding provisions of
this chapter by explicit reference to this chapter, the
provisions of this chapter to every agency of the state of
Utah and govern:
(a) all state agency actions that determine the legal
rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal
interests of one or more identifiable persons,
including all agency actions to grant, deny, revoke,
suspend, modify, annul, withdraw, or amend an
authority, right, or license; and
(b) judicial review of all such actions.

§ 63-46b-l(9) (Supp. 1993) of the Utah Code Annotated provides:
Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to restrict
a presiding officer, for good cause shown, from
lengthening or shortening any time period prescribed in
this chapter, except those time periods established for
judicial review.

§ 63-46b-2(l) (h) (1989) of the Utah Code Annotated provides:
(i)

"Presiding
individual
the agency
statute to

officer" means an agency head, or an
or body of individuals designated by
head, by the agency's rules, or by
conduct an adjudicative proceeding.

(ii) If fairness to the parties is not compromised, an
agency may substitute one presiding officer for
another during any proceeding.

within a reasonable Lime alter t*.*- C I O S L
informal adjudicative proceeding
the presiding
officer shall issue a signed order in writing that
states the following;
(i) the decision;
(ii) the reasons for the decision;
(iii) a notice of any right of administrative ox
judicial review available to the parties; and
(iv) the time limits for filing an appeal or
requesting a review.

§ 63-46b-16(4) (1989) of the Utah Code .Annotated provides
pertinent part:
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the
basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person
seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by
any of the following:
(d) ti le agency has erroneously interpreted or applied
the law ;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or
decision-making process, or has failed to follow
prescribed procedure
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D E T E R M I N A T I O N
JURISDICTION

Under the authority vested in me
Ant i -D l scr i m m a t i on
Act, of 1965, as amended, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended, I issue on behalf of this Division, the following
Determination as to the merits of the subject charge.
All jurisdictional requirements have been met as required by the
Utah Anti-Discrimination Act of 1965, as amended and Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
gyMHARY QF

CHARQE

On. August 26, J 992, Paul S Kirby, hereinafter Charging Party,
alleged that Salt Lake Community College, hereinafter Respondent,
discriminated against him based upon his sex, race, religion, and
retaliated against him.
SUMMARY OF RESPONSE
The Respondent categorically denies that Charging party was
subjected to discrimination, because of his sex, race, religion, or
that it retaliated against him.
• SUMMARY OF IN i/'EiJ 1IGATION
Charging Party's Allegations
Charging Party asserts that he was employed as an adjunct professor
at Respondent during 1991. Charging Party asserts he ran into a
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class scheduling conflict during the 1991 fall quarter. Charging
Party asserts that he notified Mr. Stowers of such conflict.
Charging Party asserts that he was eventually able to resolve the
matter, and teach the class, but asserts that such incident caused
Mr. Stowers to have animosities towards him.
Charging Party asserts that subsequently, before winter quarter of
1991, Charging Party went into Mr. Stower's office to look at his
schedule. Charging Party asserts that Mr. Stowers told him that if
anything occurred again like the scheduling conflict he had during
fall quarter, Charging Party would never teach at Respondent again.
Charging Party asserts that thereafter, he and Mr. Stowers did not
speak to each other very often.
Charging Party asserts that, he was the most qualified applicant for
the position, yet someone much less qualified than himself was
afforded said position. Charging Party asserts that he attempted
to resolve his concerns with Respondent's human resource
department, to no avail.
Charging Party asserts that in April, 1992, he submitted an
application for a Spanish instructor position with Jonathan
Stowers, Respondent's language coordinator. Charging Party asserts
that he was denied due consideration for such employment, because
he is non-hispanic, male, L.D.S., and because he objected to
homosexual inferences during an interview with Mr. Stowers.
Charging Party asserts that during his interview, Mr. Stowers
received a telephone call. Charging Party asserts that after Mr.
Stowers finished such call, he made sexual overtones towards
Charging Party. Charging Party asserts that Mr. Stowers stated
that he was so excited to hear this person's voice, that he almost
wet his pants. Charging Party asserts that he was offended by Mr.
Stower's mannerism. Charging Party asserts that Mr. Stower's knew
that Charging Party was not homosexual.
Charging Party asserts that subsequently during his interview,
Charging Party commented about his Spanish L.D.S. mission, and how
it had helped him with his knowledge of the Spanish language and
culture. Charging Party asserts that during such discussion, Mr.
Stowers squirmed, and made expressions that looked unfavorable.
Charging Party asserts that Mr. Stowers also served a L.D.S.
mission. Charging Party asserts however, that Mr. Stowers has made
negative comments to his students regarding the L.D.S. religion.
Charging Party asserts that he followed the proper chain of
command, and requested information from Barbara Pomerang, Kay
Waters and Carlos Jimenez of Respondent's affirmative action
committee, David Richardson, Respondent's dean, and Anne Erickson,
Respondent's vice president, as to why Charging Party fell out of
the running for the subject position. Charging Party asserts that
2

00541

said individuals either didn't know why he was dropped, or did not
sufficiently answer his questions. Charging Party asserts that Mr.
Jimenez told him that he had thoroughly investigated Charging
Party's case to see if religious discrimination was evident, and
that he had interviewed the five employment committee members.
Charging Party asserts that Mr. Jimenez refused to give him a copy
of his investigative report.
Charging Party asserts that Mr.
Jimenez's investigation was not satisfactory.
Charging Party asserts that he was qualified for the subject
Spanish instructor position. Charging Party asserts that said
position required a masters of science (hereinafter f,M.S.,,f or a
masters of art (hereinafter ,fM.A.lf) degree in Spanish, or a closely
related field. Charging Party asserts that he has received two
B.A.'s in political science and Spanish, respectively. Charging
Party asserts that he received his masters degree in language and
literature, with a Spanish emphasis, in 1991.
Charging Party
asserts that he has received a variety of scholarships, has been in
various honor societies, and graduated with a 3.8 G.P.A., in the
aforesaid graduate field.
Charging Party asserts that teaching experience is preferred for
the subject Spanish instructor position. Charging Party asserts
that he has such experience, as he has taught Spanish at the
University of Utah since 1988, at the Division of Continuing
Education, and is currently an adjunct Spanish instructor at
Respondent.
Charging Party asserts that he has taught forty
courses during his teaching career (i.e. five credit hours).
Charging Party further asserts that he has also taken teaching
methodology classes at the University of Utah. Charging Party
further asserts that he has participated in workshops presented by
the American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages, Inc.
Charging Party asserts that preference for the subject Spanish
instructor position was to be given to candidates with demonstrated
strengths in community college teaching. Charging Party points out
that his student evaluations at Respondent's community college,
show that he had great success in the classroom, and was able to
relate well to his students.
Charging Party asserts that non-teaching related work experience
was preferred for the subject position. Charging Party asserts
that prior to, and during his studies as a student and as a
teacher, at the University of Utah, he worked an average of 25 to
30 hours per week in non-academic employment.
Charging Party
asserts that such non-academic employment consisted of: assistant
manager of produce at Smith's Food King; member of a saxophone
quartet, which performed Mpro bono" for convalescent homes, schools
etc.; donated time to help Hispanic immigrants learn basic survival
Spanish in the Salt Lake City area; donated time as a translator
for world conferences for the L.D.S. church; and worked as a court
interpreter for Spanish speaking individuals.
3
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Charging Party asserts that the subject Spanish instructor position
was filled by Laura Gaona-Bradford (hereinafter "Bradford").
Charging Party asserts that Ms. Bradford did not have her masters
degree at the time she applied for, and was interviewed for said
position. Charging Party asserts that Ms. Bradford still did not
have her masters degree as of October, 1992.
Charging Party
asserts that Ms. Bradford received her associate degree from
Respondent, but does not have teaching experience at Respondent.
Charging Party asserts that he has been discriminated against
because of his sex, and his race. Charging Party asserts that Ms.
Bradford is a female, Hispanic immigrant of Mexican heritage.
Charging Party asserts that Respondent's policy is to hire women
and minorities to fill college goals. Charging Party asserts that
such action is reverse discrimination, because Respondent's offers
positions because of a person's circumstance rather then he or she
being the most qualified.
B.

Respondent's Answer to Charging Party's Allegations

Respondent contends that for affirmative action, an additional
procedure had been initiated whereby all search committees are
required to interview the top two qualified minorities in every
applicant pool, regardless of their total point ranking.
Respondent contends that those applicants that meet minimum
qualifications are then screened against a written set of criteria,
based upon the job qualification posted in the position
announcement•
Respondent contends that Charging Party applied for the Spanish
faculty position.
Respondent contends that Charging Party's
application was received on April 30, 1992. Respondent contends
that Charging Party was selected for, and interviewed by its search
committee, based upon his ranking on set criteria. Respondent
contends that Charging Party was then ranked number eleven out of
thirteen applicants interviewed, and was not referred to the
dean/division chair.
Respondent contends that the top six
applicants were referred on as the search committee's final
candidates for said position.
Respondent contends that the subject Spanish position was filled by
Laura Gaona-Bradford, a Hispanic female. Respondent contends that
her application was received on April 29, 1992.
Respondent
contends that Ms. Bradford was hired on July 30, 1992, as a fulltime salaried employee, and started her employment in fall quarter,
1992.
Respondent contends that Ms. Bradford was hired because of her
strong educational background, excellent command of the Spanish
language (i.e. her native language), and her teaching experience.
4
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Respondent contends that Ms. Bradford was one of the two final
applicants forwarded to the vice president by the dean. Respondent
contends that such decision was based on Ms. Bradford's ranking of
structured questions asked by the dean and division chair.
Respondent submits a summary of its investigatory report conducted
by Carlos Jimenez. Mr. Jimenez contends that his investigation
consisted of interviewing all search committee members.
Mr.
Jimenez contends that through such investigation, he was unable to
find any evidence regarding Charging Party's allegations of
discrimination based on race, sex, religion, or retaliation. Mr.
Jimenez contends that at no time, as reported by the search
committee members, was there any discussion formally or informally
regarding any of the candidates' race, sex, or religion. Mr.
Jimenez further contends that he also found no evidence of Charging
Party's allegation that he was retaliated against.

ftmvsis
Charging Party has brought this action against Respondent alleging
violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Section
2000(e), and the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act of 1965, Utah Code
Annotated Sec. 34-35-6(1)(a), which provides that an employer may
not discriminate against an employee on the basis of his/her sex,
race, religion, or retaliate against any employee.
A.

Prima Facie Case of Sex Discrimination

In order to prove discrimination based on sex exists, Charging
Party must prove: 1) he is a member of a protected class; 2) he is
qualified for the position; 3) he has been subjected to an adverse
employment action; 4) similarly situated individuals, of a
different class, were or would have been subjected to different
treatment.
Charging Party is a member of a protected class, male. Charging
Party was qualified for the position of Spanish instructor, as he
had met all of the minimum qualifications for such position.
Charging Party has been subjected to an adverse employment
decision, as he was not hired for the aforesaid position. The next
question is whether or not similarly situated individuals of a
different class, were or would have been subjected to different
treatment.
The record indicates that both Charging Party, a white male, and
Laura Bradford, a Hispanic female, applied for the same Spanish
faculty position. The record indicates that such position required
that the applicant, at a minimum, have a masters degree in Spanish
or a closely related field. The record indicates that Charging
Party had said masters degree, but was not hired for the subject
position. The record indicates that Ms. Bradford was hired for the

5
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subject position, despite the fact that she did not possess the
required masters degree. Therefore, Charging Party has established
a prima facie case of sex discrimination.
B.

Prima Facie Case of Race Discrimination

In order to make out a prima facie case of discrimination based
upon race, the Charging Party must show that he is a member of a
protected class and that he has been treated less favorable than
others in circumstances which give rise to an inference of
intentional discrimination. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
Charging Party is a member of a protected class, white. The next
question is whether or not Charging Party has been treated less
favorable than others in circumstances which give rise to an
inference of intentional discrimination.
The record indicates that both Charging Party, a white male, and
Laura Bradford, a Hispanic female, applied for the same Spanish
faculty position. The record indicates that such position required
that the applicant, at a minimum, have a masters degree in Spanish
or a closely related field. The record indicates that Charging
Party had said masters degree, but was not hired for the subject
position. The record indicates however, that Ms. Bradford was
hired for the subject position, despite the fact that she did not
possess the required masters degree. Therefore, Charging Party has
established a prima facie case of race discrimination.
C.

Prima Facie Case of Religious Discrimination

In order to establish a prima facie case of Religious
Discrimination Charging Party must prove that: 1) he was a member
of a protected class; 2) he was qualified for the position; and 3)
he was not hired for said position because of his religious
affiliation.
Charging Party must maintain this burden to
demonstrate that he was treated differently than similarly situated
employees.
Charging Party asserts that Mr. Stower's apparent dislike for the
L.D.S. religion was a factor in his rejection of Charging Party for
the subject position. However, the record indicates that Charging
Party was not a member of the protected class, as he was active
L.D.S. Charging Party has not asserted or established that his
active L.D.S. status was in the minority at Respondent.
Furthermore, Charging Party has not asserted or established that
Ms. Bradford, the successful candidate, was non-L.D.S. or inactive
L.D.S. Therefore, Charging Party has failed to establish a prima
facie case of religion discrimination.
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D.

Prima Facie Case of Retaliation Discrimination

In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation
discrimination, Charging Party must demonstrate:
1) that he
engaged in activities protected by the Act or Title VII; 2) the
Respondent thereafter subjected him to adverse employment action;
3) and that a causal link exists between the two* Love v. RE/MAX
of America. Inc. . 738 F.2d 383, 385 (10th Cir. 1984); Burrus v.
United Tel. Co.. 683 F.2d 339, 343 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 459
U.S. 1071 (1982).
The record indicates that although there was some animosity
between Charging Party and Mr. Stowers, Charging Party did not
assert any claim of discrimination until after Ms. Bradford was
hired, and he filed this claim. Therefore, Charging Party has
failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation
discrimination.
E.

Comparison

Charging Party asserts that he is a white male, who possessed the
minimum requirements for a Spanish faculty position, but was not
hired.
Charging Party asserts that Laura Bradford, a Hispanic
female, was given said faculty position, despite her failure to
possess the minimum requirements for such position.
F.

Respondent's Burden

The next question is whether or not Respondent has articulated a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct. Respondent's
arguments are set forth below for completeness.
Respondent contends that for affirmative action, an additional
procedure had been initiated whereby all search committees are
required to interview the top two qualified minorities in every
applicant pool, regardless of their total point ranking.
Respondent contends that those applicants that meet minimum
qualifications are then screened against a written set of criteria,
based upon the job qualification posted in the position
announcement.
Respondent contends that Charging Party applied for the Spanish
faculty position.
Respondent contends that Charging Party's
application was received on April 30, 1992. Respondent contends
that Charging Party was selected for, and interviewed by its search
committee, based upon his ranking on set criteria. Respondent
contends that Charging Party was then ranked number eleven out of
thirteen applicants interviewed, and was not referred to the
dean/division chair.
Respondent contends that the top six
applicants were referred on as the search committee's final
candidates for said position.
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Respondent contends that the subject Spanish position was filled by
Laura Gaona-Bradford, a Hispanic female. Respondent contends that
her application was received on April 29, 1992.
Respondent
contends that Ms. Bradford was hired on July 30, 1992, as a fulltime salaried employee, and started her employment in fall quarter,
1992.
Respondent contends that Ms. Bradford was hired because of her
strong educational background, excellent command of the Spanish
language (i.e. her native language), and her teaching experience.
Respondent contends that Ms. Bradford was one of the two final
applicants forwarded to the vice president by the dean. Respondent
contends that such decision was based on Ms. Bradford's ranking of
structured questions asked by the dean and division chair.
Respondent submits a summary of its investigatory report conducted
by Carlos Jimenez. Mr. Jimenez contends that his investigation
consisted of interviewing all search committee members.
Mr.
Jimenez contends that through such investigation, he was unable to
find any evidence regarding Charging Party's allegations of
discrimination based on race, sex, religion, or retaliation. Mr.
Jimenez contends that at no time, as reported by the search
committee members, was there any discussion formally or informally
regarding any of the candidates' race, sex, or religion. Mr.
Jimenez further contends that he also found no evidence of Charging
Party's allegation that he was retaliated against.
The record indicates that the subject Spanish faculty position was
posted on March 27, 1992, and was closed on April 30, 1992. The
record indicates that the minimum qualifications for such position
are as follows:
1.
2.
3.

M.S. or M.A. degree in Spanish or closely related field
required.
Teaching experience preferred. Preference is given to
candidates with demonstrated strength in community
college teaching.
Non-teaching related work experience preferred.

The record indicates that at the time of his interview, Charging
Party had a masters degree in languages and literature with a
Spanish emphasis.
The record indicates that the successful
applicant, Laura Bradford, did not have a masters degree at the
time of her interview, and was not expecting to receive such degree
until June, 1992, nearly two months after the subject position
closed.
The record indicates that both Charging Party and Ms. Bradford had
teaching experience. The record indicates that Charging Party had
more college level teaching experience.
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The record indicates that Charging Party had demonstrated strength
in community college teaching, whereas Ms. Bradford did not have
any community college teaching experience.
The record indicates that both Charging Party and Ms. Bradford had
similar non-teaching related work experience. The record indicates
that Charging Party appears to have had more such experience.
The record indicates that Ms. Bradford did not have the minimum
requirements for the subject position, as she did not have a
master's degree, or the preferred levels of experience.
Furthermore, as a result of such deficiency, and according to
Respondent's policy, Ms. Bradford should not have been considered
for the subject position.
Therefore, Respondent has not
articulated a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct.
G.

Summary

Charging Party has failed to establish a prima facie case of
religion and retaliation discrimination. However, Charging Party
has established a prima facie case of sex and race discrimination.
Therefore, the facts in the record, viewed in their entirety,
indicate that there is REASONABLE CAUSE to believe that Charging
Party was subjected to discriminatory practices as alleged. This
concludes the Division's informal investigative adjudication
procedure.
ON BEHALF OF THE DIVISION,

</

Randall Phillips, Investigator

Date

44X4

11
Collen Trayner, Esquire

sJanuairu
Date

9
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ADDENDUM C

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIVISION
UADD Case No. 92-0590
EEOC No. 35C-92-0611
PAUL S. KIRBY
COMPLAINANT,

*
#
*

vs.
SALT LAKE COMMUNITY COLLEGE,
RESPONDENT.

*
*
*

ORDER

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

On January 2i,
1993, the Anti-Discrimination Division (Division) of the
Industrial Commission of Utah (Commission) issued a determination of
"Reasonable Cause" that the Respondent has violated the Utah AntiDiscrimination Act of 1965, Chapter 35, Title 34, Utah Code Annotated, as
amended, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.
If the Respondent is desirous of attempting to conciliate this Determination,
this must be done by contacting the director within ten (10) days from the
date of this Order.
Failure to reach conciliation shall result in the
Respondent being required to provide the following relief:
BELIEF
The Respondent, UTAH COMMUNITY COLLEGE, is hereby ordered to provide full
relief to Charging Party, PAUL S. KIRBY. Full relief shall include:
1.

That Respondent provide Charging Party with a position commensurate with
a full-time faculty position in Spanish, effective immediately;

2.

Further, that the Respondent agrees to provide Charging Party with all
lost wages, plus 10%;

3.

Further, that no retaliation be brought by Respondent against the
Charging Party for bringing this action;

4.

Further, that Charging Party be awarded reasonable attorneys fees;

5.

Further, that Respondent reaffirms its commitment to comply with the
Utah Anti-Discrimination Act of 1965, Chapter 35, Title 34, Utah Code
Annotated, as amended, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended•

If a party wishes to appeal this Order, a written request for a formal
hearing must be filed with the Director of the Division within thirty (30)
days from the date of the issuance of this Order as specified in Section 3435-7.1(4)(c), U.C.A., and Administrative Rule R560-1-4.A.3 and 4. A request
for agency review and a formal hearing will not be considered necessary if
the hearing will not add to the evidence in the investigatory file or cause
the evidence to be viewed differently.

If the Director receives no timely request for a hearing, this Order becomes
the final Order of the Commission with no further rights of appeal as
specified in Section 34-35-7.1(4)(d), U.C.A.

Colleen Trayner, Esquire

Date

Q
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ADDENDUM D

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6615
Paul S. Kirby,
Charging Party,

ORDER OF
DISMISSAL

*

vs.
Salt Lake Community College,

UADD No. 92-0590
EEOC No. 35C-92-0611
Respondent.

*

*********************************

The request for an evidentiary hearing in the above
entitled matter to review de novo the Determination and Order of
the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division having been duly considered,
and it having been determined that the RESPONDENT has failed to:
File its request for de novo review within 30 days of the
date of the order as required by R560-1-4A(3) of the Utah Admin.
Code (1993);
And it appearing that the foregoing constitutes good
cause for dismissing the request,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the request of the
RESPONDENT be, and the same is hereby, dismissed without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review or
specific written objection hereto must be filed with the Commission
within thirty (30) days from the date of this Order, or it shall be
the final Order of the Commission, not subject to further review or
appeal. A Motion for Review must be signed by the party seeking
review; state the grounds for review and the relief requested;
state the date upon which it was mailed; and be sent by mail to the
undersigned, and to each party.

TimothyC
Presiding

.len
iministrative Law Judge

Certified by.the Industrial Commission of
Utah this //&day of*~?rf«^<L
1993.

Patricia O.

ission Secretary

'OQSTS

CERTIFICATE OF HAILING

I certify that on March_///,^y 1993 # a copy of the
attached Order of Dismissal in the UADD case of Paul S. Kirby vs.
Salt Lake Community College, was mailed to the following persons at
the following addresses, postage paid:
Paul S. Kirby
290 North 5th East
Kaysville, UT 84037
Carlos A. Jimenez
Director of Diversity/EO
Salt Lake Community College
P.O. Box 30808
SLC, UT 84130-0611
Anna R. Jensen
Director
Industrial Commission of Utah
UADD Division
160 East 300 South
SLC, UT 84114-6630

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

By -^%JU*<^,
/SOLA-*.t r * " W ^
Wilma Burrows
Adjudication Division
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ADDENDUM E

PAUL S. KIRBY,

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-6600
*
*

Charging Party,
vs.

*
*
*

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

*

SALT LAKE COMMUNITY COLLEGE,

*
*

Respondent.

*

UADD No. 920590

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

The Industrial Commission of Utah (Commission) reviews the
Motion for Review of the charging party in the above captioned
matter# pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, §§ 34-35-7.1(11) and 6346b-12.
The Utah Anti-Discrimination Division (UADD) issued a "cause"
finding in the above captioned matter by Order dated January 22,
1993. The Order stated that the non-prevailing party had 30 days
to request an evidentiary hearing. On February 23, 1993, the UADD
received the respondents request for an evidentiary hearing. The
request for an evidentiary hearing was denied by order issued on
March 11, 1993, because it was not filed within 30 days of the date
the order was issued as required by U.A.C. R560-1-4A(3) and U.C.A.
§ 34-35-7.1(4) (c) .
Our decision in this case is based upon
jurisdictional issues and, therefore, we will not address the
merits of the underlying case.
On March 11, 1993 the Commission received a letter from
respondent which stated that the respondent, "had a conversation
with the Director of UADD, Ms. Anna Jensen. I had indicated to her
that the College would indeed request a review of the findings by
UADD....,f The letter stated that ff[t]he reason for the delay was
due to a recent college internal procedural change.
The new
procedure requires such correspondence as the one requested to be
circulated and viewed by appropriate College department heads.11
Letter from Mr. Jimenez, 03/11/93.
On March 17, 1993, the respondent filed its motion for review
of the ALJ's March 11, 1993 order raising three issues:
(1)
whether the commission failed to allow a reasonable opportunity for
Respondent to respond to the charging party's pleading before the
order was issued; (2) whether the order was issued without
consideration of Respondent's reply memorandum; and (3) whether the
commission's action was manifestly unfair and prejudicial to
Respondent and clearly contrary to the law which requires the
Division to be fair and unbiased toward both parties.
The respondent, citing U.C.A. § 63-46b-l(9), requested that
the commission allow additional time for filing its motion for
review after the time for filing had run. The charging party
asserts that U.C.A. § 63-46b-l(9) does not apply in this case
because the time period in question is set out in U.C.A. § 34-35-
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7.1(4) (c) , not the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) • U.C.A.
S 63-46b-l(9) provides that:
Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to
restrict a presiding officer, for good cause
shown, from lengthening or shortening any time
period prescribed in this chapter, except those
time periods established for judicial review.
In order for a provision in a statute such as the Utah AntiDiscrimination Act to supersede a similar provision in the UAPA, the
statute must make explicit reference to the UAPA. U.C.A. § 63-46b1(1). U.C.A. § 34-35-7.1(4)(c) does not state that it is intended
to supersede the time periods set out in the UAPA, and therefore, the
time for filing a request for formal hearing is governed by U.C.A. §
63-46b-12. However, there is no conflict as both statutes establish
a 30 day time period for filing an appeal.
However, the Court of Appeals in
Varian-Eimac. Inc. v.
Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989), held that the time for
filing a motion for review to the Industrial Commission is
jurisdictional. The court reasoned that the mandatory language in
the statute terminated the commissions jurisdiction once the filing
time period was exceeded and noted that its interpretation of the
statute was consistent with Utah appellate court decisions on similar
time limits. Lamoreaux at 570. U.C.A. § 34-35-7.1(d) provides that,
11
[i]f the director receives no timely request for a hearing, the
determination and order issued by the director becomes the final
order of the commission."
"Subject matter jurisdiction is the power and
authority of the court to determine a controversy and without which it cannot proceed."
Thompson v. Jackson. 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah
App. 1987).
If a court acts beyond its
authority those acts are null and void. Id....
The sources of jurisdictional limits may vary
according to they type of court involved.
However, it is basic that "the jurisdictional
limits of a statutorily created court... are
circumscribed by its empowering legislation."
Id. It follows that the subject matter
jurisdiction of a quasi-judicial administrative
agency, such as the Industrial Commission, which
is a statutory creation, would also be "fixed by
statute." Retherford v. Industrial Comm'n of *
Utah, 739 P.2d 76, 80 (Utah App. 1987). Just
as any court, the
Commission should first
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determine that it has jurisdiction and, if it
does not, dismiss the matter.
Any action
beyond its jurisdiction is void.
Varian-Eimac. Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Ut. Ct. App.
1989).
An agency order is considered "issued" on the date the order
is signed by the administrative law judge or commission.
Bonded
Bicvcle Couriers v. Dept. of Empl. S e c . 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 79 (CA,
12/04/92).
Therefore, the order in this matter was issued on
January 22, 1992 and that is the date that the time for filing
began to run. The Respondent failed to timely request an extension
of time in which to file or timely file its motion for review.
Therefore, the commission lacks jurisdiction to take any action
other than to dismiss this matter.
ORDER:
IT IS ORDERED that the ORDER OF DISMISSAL issued by the
administrative law judge on March 11, 1993 is hereby affirmed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah
Court of Appeals within 30 days of the date of the order, pursuant
to Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46b-16, and Couriers v. Dep't of
Emol. Sec, et al.. 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 79 (CA, 12/4/92).
The
requesting party shall bear all costs to prepare a transcript of
the hearing for appeals purposes.

St'etohen M. Hadle^
Chalrmc
v

%idc Um^

Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner

Colleen S. Colton
Commissioner
Certified this /j£^
ATTEST:
Patricia 0. Ashbyf
Commission Secrete

day of ^ 7 ^ ,
(I

1993,

/
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the
day of
, 1993, I
mailed the attached ORDER in the matter of PAUL K30(BY V. SALT LAKE
COMMUNITY COLLEGE, UADD No. 920590, first class postage prepaid, to
the following:
John S. McAllister, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
Beneficial Life Tower, Suite 1100
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Louise T. Knauer, Esq.
261 East 300 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Paul S. Kirby
290 North 5th East
Kaysville, Utah 84037
Carlos A. Jimenez
Director of Diversity/EO
Salt Lake Community College
P.O. Box 30808
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130
Timothy C. Allen
Adjudication Division
(via interoffice mail)
Anna R. Jensen, Dir.
Utah Anti-Discrimination Division
(via interoffice mail)

t$£um%
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ADDENDUM F

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-6600
PAUL S. KIRBY,
Charging Party,
vs.

*

SALT LAKE COMMUNITY COLLEGE,

*

Respondent.

*

ORDER ON MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION
AND CLARIFICATION

UADD No. 920590

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

The Industrial Commission of Utah (commission) reviews the
Motion for Review of the respondent in the above captioned matter,
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, § 63-46b-13.
The respondent timely
the commission's denial
administrative law judge's
a formal hearing under the

filed a motion for reconsideration of
of its motion for review of an
(ALJ) order dismissing its request for
Utah Anti-Discrimination Act.

The respondent requests (1) that the commission clarify the
phrase "without prejudice" in the ALJ's order which was affirmed by
the commission, and (2) that the commission re-examine its
determination that it lacks jurisdiction to hear its motion for
review. We will examine these issues in reverse order.
I. DOES RULE 6(e) APPLY TO EXTEND THE
PERIOD FOR PILING A MOTION POR REVIEW?
The respondent argues that Varian-Eimac v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d
569 (Ut. App. 1989) (Lamoreaux I) , does not compel an outright
dismissal and points to footnote one of that opinion which states
in part that, "Additional days will be allowed when the filing is
sent by mail or when the last day of the period falls on a weekend
or a holiday. Utah R. Civ. P. 6." Lamoreaux I, 767 P.2d 569, 570,
fn. 1. The respondent further asserts that the Utah Supreme Court
in Griffith v. Industrial Commission, 300 P.2d 204 (Utah 1965),
held that Rule 6(e) U.R.C.P. was not inconsistent with and not
clearly inapplicable to Industrial Commission procedure and
therefore supplemented Commission procedure to allow timely filing
of a petition for rehearing not filed within the 30 day time
period.
In Lamoreaux I the commission granted the untimely filed
motion for review and reversed the ALJ. The commissions decision
was appealed by the respondent to the court of appeals which held
that the time limit for filing a motion for review before the
commission was jurisdictional. The case was remanded so that the
commission could take evidence on the issue of whether the
applicant's motion for review was timely filed.
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Griffith and Lamoreaux I are both pre-Utah Administrative
Procedure Act (UAPA) decisions. The Utah Supreme Court in Griffith
concluded that Rule 81(a) U.R.C.P.# which provides that M[t]hese
rules shall apply to all special statutory proceedings, except
insofar as such rules are by their nature clearly inapplicable"
applied the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to supplement the rules
of procedure of the Industrial Commission. The Griffith Court held
that Rule 6(e) U.R.C.P. applies to extend the time for filing a
petition for rehearing when the notice was served by mail. Rule 1,
U.R.C.P., however, provides that •• [t]hese rules shall govern the
procedure in the Supreme Court, the district courts, the circuit
courts, and the justice courts of the state of Utah in all actions,
suits and proceedings of a civil nature, whether cognizable at law
or in equity, and in all special statutory proceedings, except as
governed by other rules promulgated by this court or enacted by the
Legislature and except as stated in Rule 81.,f
In a later ruling, the Utah Supreme Court noted that "[w]hile
the mode of procedure before administrative bodies may conform to
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the rules governing civil
procedure in the trial courts are not necessarily applicable to
administrative proceedings. See e.g. Silverman v. Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n, 549 F.2d 28 (7th Cir. 1977) ....
Thus,
administrative proceedings are not subject to the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure unless the governing statute or regulations so
provide." Pilcher v. Dep't of Social Services. 663 P.2d 450 (Utah
1983). We believe that the rule articulated in Pilcher correctly
determines the applicability of the U.R.C.P. to administrative
proceedings in Utah.
The UAPA provides in relevant part that "except as otherwise
provided by a statute superseding provisions of this chapter by
specific reference to this chapter, the provisions of this chapter
apply to every agency of the state of Utah..." U.C.A. §~63-46b1(1) (1992). The UAPA does not state generally that the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure apply to all administrative proceedings. To the
contrary, the UAPA contains only limited, specific references to
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See U.C.A. § 63-46b-l(4)(b)
(providing that Rules 12(b) and 56 U.R.C.P. apply to motions to
dismiss or for summary judgment except to the extent that those
rules are modified by UAPA); U.C.A. § 63-46b-7 (providing that the
rules of discovery under the U.R.C.P. apply if the agency has not
enacted rules for discovery); U.C.A. § 63-46b-ll(3) (providing that
a defaulted party may file a motion to set aside a default order
under the procedures outlined in the U.R.C.P.); U.C.A. S 63-46b15(2) (providing that a petition for judicial review of informal
adjudicative proceedings shall be a complaint governed by the
U.R.C.P. and that all other pleadings and proceedings in the
district court are governed by the U.R.C.P.); U.C.A. § 63-46b19(1)(c) (providing that the venue for proceedings to enforce
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agency orders is governed by the requirements of the U.R.C.P.).
Therefore, under Pilcher, it is clear that under UAPA, only
those sections of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure expressly
adopted by UAPA or the agency, or those which expressly state they
are intended to apply under UAPA, apply to administrative
proceedings in Utah.
II. CLARIFICATION OF THE PHRASE
••WITHOUT PREJUDICE11 IN THE COMMISSION'S ORDER.
The respondent notes that the order issued by the ALJ on March
11, 1993 was issued "without prejudice.1' The use of the term
••without prejudice" indicates that the dismissal was not based on
the merits of the underlying case. We believe that we erred in
simply affirming the ALJ's dismissal and that we should have
dismissed the matter outright based upon our own review of the
matter for lack of jurisdiction.
ORDER:
IT IS ORDERED that the RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR REVIEW AND
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the District
Court of the State of Utah within 30 days of the date of the order,
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46b-15, Alumbauah
v. White. 800 P.2d 825 (Utah App. 1990), and Couriers v. Dep't of
Empl. Sec, et al., 201 Utah Adv. Rep.V\709 (CA, ^2/^/92) .
Stephen
Chairm

0

Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner
&£+>

Certified this f ^
A

day of

o l l e e n S. Col on
Commissioner
f/^rJ
1993

STs^*^

P a t r i c i a 0 . Ash]
Commission Secret^

r\r\s?A't

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I, Adell Butler-Mitchell, certify that I did mail by prepaid
first class postage, except as noted below, a copy of the ORDER ON
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND CLARIFICATION in the case of PAUL S.
KIRBY, Case Number 920590, on tft* day of (Jt^^x
, 19&3
to the following:
/
LOUISE T. KNAUER
261 EAST 300 SOUTH, SUITE 300
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
J. CLARK WHITEHEAD
DIRECTOR, PERSONNEL SERVICES
SALT LAKE COMMUNITY COLLEGE
P O BOX 30808
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, 84130
JAN GRAHAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
JOHN S MCALLISTER
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
BENEFICIAL LIFE TOWER, SUITE 1100
36 SOUTH STATE STREET
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
PAUL S. KIRBY
290 NORTH 5TH EAST
KAYSVILLE, UTAH 84037
CARLOS A. JIMENEZ
DIRECTOR OF DIVERSITY/EEO
SALT LAKE COMMUNITY COLLEGE
P O BOX 30808
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84130
ANNA R. JENSEN, DIR.
UTAH ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIVISION
TIMOTHY C. ALLEN
ADJUDICATION DIVISION

Adell Butle£rMitchell
Paralegal
General Counsel's Office
Industrial Commission of Utah
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Applicants may apply by mail or in person at the Salt Lake Community College Personnel Office,
AD 160, 4600 South Redwood Road, P.O. Box 30808, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84130. Office Hours
8 to 4:30. Job Hotline (801) 967-4133. Personnel Office (801) 967-4210.
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'elopmenta! Math (2 Positions)* •
'elopmental English Composition*
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guage (Spanish)
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chology
lology

Salt Lake Community College is a comprehensive urban
college with two campuses (Redwood Road and South City),
two centers (Sandy and International Airport) and two
satellites (West Jordan and Magna) located in the Salt Lake
Valley and a satellite located in Tooele Valley, 40 miles west
of Salt Lake City. All of the facilities are surrounded by
beautiful mountains abundant with year-round sport and
recreational opportunities, including camping, hiking, boating,
hang gliding, hunting and fishing. There are seven ski resorts
within 30 minutes of Salt Lake City. Utah's professional
symphony orchestra, opera, ballet and modern dance
companies, several quality theaters (including the College's
own Grand Theater), professional basketball, football, hockey
and baseball teams offer a well-rounded variety of activities.

NATIONAL
iness Management*
nputer Information Systems*
imetology
ironies
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sing (2 Positions)**
ce Information Systems

Salt Lake Community College serves its unique and diverse
15,375 credit student population with more than 120
programs in the Schools of Business and Technology,
Continuing and Community Education, Humanities and
Sciences, and Occupational Education.
Articulation
agreements help students transfer SLCC credits to four-year
colleges and universities.
In addition, about 10,000
individuals are enrolled in non-credit related educational
programs.

idgmic-requires earned master's by fall '92 in related area
squires bachelor's). Vocational-reouires earned bachelor's
all '92 in related area or six years of directly related work
erience (•master's preferred, * •master's required),
inning rank and beginning salary (mid. 20's approx.)
endent upon qualifications.
See individual position
ouncement for all requirements.

A kaleidoscopic experience is available in The Applied
Technology Center, The Center for Entrepreneurship, Skills
Center, Salt Lake Community Arts Center, Career Action
Center, Child Care Center and apprenticeship programs. In
addition, program choices range from cosmetology to truck
driving, from welding to academic studies, from athletic to
aviation maintenance, and from geology to graphic design.
Certificates and diplomas are offered, as well as three
>UCATI0N PROCESS: Applications due April 30. 1992. degrees (AAS, AS, AA).
i will be notified by mail or phone the status of your
lication.
Each position requires a separate set ofSLCC is now serving 1,275 minorities and 850 disabled
lication materials. To be considered for employment you students. About half the student body are female. The
>t complete the following:
average age of students is 28. The College has a national
reputation for high quality technical graduates who have
Cover letter
consistently won medals at VICA, PBL, DEX, and other state
Official Salt Lake Community College Application
and national competitions. Our Medical programs have
Resume/Vita
CAHEA and other national accreditation, and the new RN
Transcripts (un-official photocopies are acceptable until Nursing program is eligible for National League for Nursing
hiring) and
accreditation. The College's Business programs are fully
accredited by the Association of Collegiate Business Schools
Three current letters of recommendation.
and Programs.
d completed applications and supporting material to:
What people are saying:
Salt Lake Community College
"Best managed state government," financial World Magazine
"Best city in which to do business," Fortune Magazine
Personnel Services Office
States ranked by health-UTAH t\. National Health Survey
4600 South Redwood Road
P.O. Box 30808
SLCC is an equal opportunity instituiij^/0^pV^ n fl
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130
educational and employment opportunities without regard to
Phone: 801-967-4210
race, color, creed, sex. national oriain, aae. or handicap.

SALT'
LAKEI
COMMUNITY
COLLEGE
FACULTY POSITIONS
Staffing Fall '92
ACAPEMIg-Acrobice/Fitncas for Life, Biology,
Chemistry,
Communications/Broadcasting,
Developmental Math* (2 Poe.), Developmental
English Composition*, History, Humanities/Art
History,
y, Language (Spanish), Math (3 ]Po».), Political
Science, Psychology, Sociology.
VQCATJONALrBusincsa Management* Computer
Information Systems*. Cosmetology, Electronics,
Medical Assistant/Medical Secretary, Nursing** (2
Poa.), Office Information Systems.
Academic-requires earned truster's by fall *92 in
related area f'requires bachelor's}. Vocationalrequire! earned bachelor's by fall *9i in related area
or six vears of directly related work experience
('master s preferred, "master's required). Beginnin|
rank and beginning aalary (mid. 20's spprox.)
dependent upon qualifications. See individual position
announcement for all requirements.
APPLICATION PROCESS; Applications due April
30, 1992. You will be notified by mail or phone the
sums of your application. Each position requires a
-separate aet of application materials. To be considered
for employment, you must complete the following:
cover letter, official Salt Lake Community College
Application, resumcMia. iranacripis (un-officia)
photocopies are acceptable until hiring) and three
current letters of recommendation. Send completed
applications and supporting materials lo: Salt Lake
Community College. Personnel Serrices Office,
4600 South Redwood Road, P.O. Box 30808, Sail
U k e City, Utah 84130, Pbooe:801-9*7.4210.
An Affirmatif e Action
Equal Opportunity Employer

bALT LAKE
COMMUNITY COLLEGE]
POSTED: March 27, 1992
CLOSED: April 30, 1992

POSITION ANNOUNCEMENT
POSITION TITLE:

Faculty Position in Spanish

REPORTS TO:

Director, Humanities Division

STARTING SALARY RANGE:

Beginning rank and beginning salary (mid 20's approx.) dependent upon
qualifications for a nine month letter of appointment. Initial employment
to begin September 1992. Night and summer teaching possible for
additional remuneration. Excellent benefits.

MAJOR FUNCTION:
Under general supervision the instructor will teach primarily beginning and intermediate Spanish classes
supplemented with courses in other languages.
RESPONSIBILITIES AND DUTIES:
1.

Provide instruction in beginning Spanish classes as assigned.

2.

Assess and maintain records of student performance.

3.

Develop consistent course outlines.

4.

Participate in upgrading curriculum.

5.

Attend regularly scheduled meetings and workshops.

6.

Maintain office consultation hours.

7.

Accept committee assignments.

8.

Advise students on program requirements.

9.

Accept other duties as assigned.

(over)
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MINIMUM QUALIFICATIONS:
1.

M.S. or M.A. degree in Spanish or closely related field required.

2.

Teaching experience preferred.
community college teaching.

3.

Non-teaching related work experience preferred.

APPLICATIONS:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Preference is given to candidates with demonstrated strength in

To be considered for employment, you must complete the following:

Cover letter.
Official Salt Lake Community College Application.
Resume/Vita.
Transcripts (un-official photocopies are acceptable until hiring).
Three current letters of recommendation;

Send completed applications and supporting material to:
Salt Lake Community College
Personnel Services Office
4600 South Redwood Road
P.O. Box 30808
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130
Phone: 801-967-4210
For a complete listing of all full-time positions available at Salt Lake Community College, call 801-967-4133.
Women and Minorities are encouraged to apply.
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 requires that work eligibility be documented for all new
employees. Please be prepared to verify your eligibility for employment if hired at the College.

SLCC-AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY/AFFIRMATIVE ACTION EMPLOYER

